Donald Trump’s executive order on biosecurity, issued on May 5, 2025, has shocked American scientists: pathogen research has been halted, and DNA and RNA synthesis now requires government approval. This directly threatens vaccine development, genomic research, and even routine medical tests. Geneticist Dmitry Pruss speaks to T-invariant editor Alexander Sergeev about the escalating crisis in U.S. biomedical science, draws parallels with the Soviet past, and explains why these trends are dangerous for the entire world.
From the outset of Donald Trump’s second presidency, an unprecedented attack on American biomedical science began. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest operator of scientific research budgets in the U.S., immediately faced a travel ban, a hiring freeze, and staff reductions. While the expert community was reeling, the Senate confirmed Robert F. Kennedy Jr., known for his pseudoscientific anti-vaccine views, as the Secretary of Health.
Under the new policy, grants related to mRNA vaccine technology, which was used in the fight against COVID-19, began to be blocked. Paradoxically, the day after his inauguration, Trump unveiled the ambitious AI project Stargate, which highlighted this technology as a method for rapidly synthesizing personalized cancer vaccines. Now, it is effectively banned.
Key positions are being filled by figures far removed from science. David Geier, who was fined for practicing medicine without a license, has long promoted, alongside his father Mark Geier, the pseudoscientific idea linking autism to vaccines and will now oversee revived research on this long-discredited topic. Recently, Casey Means, whose surgical training was never completed and whose inactive medical license was previously used in alternative medicine, was nominated as U.S. Surgeon General.
The culmination was Trump’s May 5, 2025, executive order, signed under the pretext of biosecurity. It suspends research on pathogens and toxins for four months and requires government committee approval for DNA and RNA synthesis. This jeopardizes vaccine development, genome sequencing, and routine tests. This is not mere bureaucracy; it is a severe blow to scientific inquiry and the health of millions. Geneticist Dmitry Pruss explains why this crisis parallels Lysenkoism.
T-invariant: The new executive order on biosecurity has caused alarm bordering on panic among American biomedical scientists. What will be the consequences for science?
Dmitry Pruss: The U.S. President’s executive order of May 5 on research biosecurity aims to prevent the creation of dangerous pathogens and biological products in research projects. Fears about scientists creating artificial monsters are at least as old as the legend of the Golem or the tale of Frankenstein, and such questions have been raised repeatedly in modern biotechnology. But the context of this order is less philosophical and more immediately political.
It is rooted in the conviction of the new administration’s supporters that COVID-19 had an artificial origin and that American scientists and politicians either deliberately suppressed this idea in scientific publications or were complicit in creating the virus. In both cases, the scientific community is seen as part of the “deep state” — a hypothetical entity hostile to the current administration. In this context, virology and epidemiology are being scapegoated for the pandemic’s hardships, with American science and education targeted to deter scientists from criticizing political leadership or challenging pro-government pseudoscience.
The role of laboratory research in COVID-19’s origin cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty, though extreme hypotheses — such as “American scientists funded enhanced coronavirus research in China, and the resulting viruses escaped” — are demonstrably false.
Still, there’s no doubt that research on dangerous pathogens requires close attention. Past studies, especially for military purposes, have seen dangerous incidents, and there’s no full assurance that modern researchers, with their powerful tools, have learned all necessary lessons from past mistakes. But it’s equally undeniable that studying evolving dangerous microorganisms is vital for humanity’s biosecurity.
Striking the right balance between necessity and caution is a complex issue requiring thorough discussion. For now, I can only note that the executive order’s bans on microorganism and toxin research, as well as DNA and RNA synthesis, are so broad that they spell the collapse of microbiological and genomic research. Instead of a careful balance, we’re dealt a sledgehammer blow.
T-i: Which research areas will be most affected by this order?
DP: This is a broad assault on biomedicine, primarily targeting research on pathogens and biological agents. All pathogen studies are subject to a temporary four-month halt and, thereafter, must await approval from a future government committee, which will ensure that research cannot enhance pathogenicity, toxicity, host range, drug resistance, or immune evasion.
I’ll note right away that developing new drugs against pathogens gaining resistance to old ones almost entirely depends on recreating resistance genes in lab models. Developing seasonal or updated vaccines against evolving pathogens relies heavily on recreating evolved epitopes (molecular segments recognized by the immune system. — Ed.) in the lab. Thus, all work on creating and improving drugs and vaccines will never resume as “guaranteed safe.”
Formally, this doesn’t mean a complete halt to development, as the order allows the future committee to grant special exemptions. In reality, it means lobbying and political connections will become prerequisites for continuing work, with biosecurity requirements rising to extreme levels, causing additional costs and delays. Who will be among the lucky few with the right connections, permits, and funds? This uncertainty is rattling the entire industry.
But the bans on “artificially enhancing pathogens” go far beyond drug, vaccine, and test development. They ricochet into much broader areas of biomedicine and biotechnology. Strictly speaking, any standard molecular cloning could be banned because it relies on a plasmid with an antibiotic resistance gene inserted into E. coli. (The resistance gene helps select bacteria that have incorporated the plasmid carrying the studied gene. — Ed.) Since such bacteria are potential pathogens, conferring antibiotic resistance will now be prohibited. Growing potentially pathogenic viruses in animal cell cultures, like the classic Vero cells from monkeys (easier to culture and approved for lab use. — Ed.), could also be banned because, for example, human viruses quickly adapt to new hosts, which is now prohibited, even if it’s an unintended byproduct of experiments.
The “ricochet effect” is especially strong from the three-month ban on DNA and RNA synthesis. The pretext is fear that someone could recreate extinct pathogens (e.g., smallpox) or “enhance” existing ones with synthetic genes. Control over such (nonexistent but potentially possible) orders has recently been handled by DNA synthesis companies. Under the new order, the government will approve DNA and RNA synthesis and sales. Yet, without synthetic nucleic acid fragments, modern genomic research is impossible, and the vast diversity of synthetic DNA (hundreds of thousands to millions of fragments) makes it unclear whether the new bureaucracy can process such massive requests in a reasonable timeframe.
The situation is especially dire for research organizations due to a provision requiring them to report all projects that might conflict with the order. Failure to do so risks the entire organization losing grants for years. Thus, institutes and universities must shut down their own research at the slightest doubt, under threat of institutional collapse.
T-i: You mentioned that even routine operations like DNA and RNA synthesis now require government approval. How will this complicate lab work, and what could be the consequences for research timelines and costs?
DP: The development of genomic technologies in recent years relies on the vast diversity of synthetic nucleic acid fragments. These are essential for “fishing out” specific genes or markers from natural DNA or RNA for analysis — e.g., extracting a limited set of genes from the 3 billion “letters” of the human genome for clinical analysis or isolating DNA of specific species (e.g., ancient humans, not decomposing microbes) from soil, seawater, or archaeological bones.
For analyzing dozens or hundreds of small DNA segments, the workhorse is the well-known PCR (polymerase chain reaction). For PCR, each genomic fragment requires a pair of synthetic DNA molecules—primers for enzymatic synthesis of the desired fragment’s copies, one for each end.
However, most modern research requires more than dozens or hundreds of genomic targets — it demands genome-wide coverage, requiring at least hundreds of thousands or millions of targets spread across the genome. Even then, untargeted genome regions may only yield statistical inferences.
For simultaneous work with thousands or millions of DNA segments, PCR is inadequate. Here, molecular hybridization comes into play, forming miniature double helices from sample DNA and synthetic DNA molecules, either in test tubes or on microchip surfaces for analysis. Only a few manufacturers can synthesize DNA fragments for hybridization in the hundreds of thousands. Currently, biosecurity control lies with these companies, which block suspicious orders from new buyers or institutes in questionable countries. How the government will manage DNA content control for all clients with such a massive workload is unimaginable.
T-i: This order isn’t the first action by the Trump administration complicating life for biomedical researchers. It feels like they’re almost hostile to this field.
DP: Political demands, largely tied to public rejection of pandemic measures, led to an alliance between classic Trumpism, anti-vaxxers, and pseudoscience advocates, culminating in the appointment of former presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. as Health Secretary. To secure Senate confirmation, professional anti-vaxxer Kennedy had to forgo an immediate attack on vaccines and drugs, opting instead for a gradual, methodical siege of biomedicine’s strongholds.
His allies — anti-vaccine activists and skeptics, often driven by personal vendettas against mainstream medicine — are being appointed to leadership positions. Research budgets are being slashed across multiple fronts, mass layoffs are underway, and new units are being staffed with questionable pseudo-experts. Capturing the full scope of this disaster in brief is impossible.
For example, semi-literate statistician David Geier, previously fined heavily for practicing medicine without a license (he “treated” autism with transgender hormones), will now investigate “evidence” of vaccine harm. Meanwhile, leading autism expert Dr. Cara Pugliese (Dr. Cara Pugliese) was unceremoniously fired, with her recent promotion used as a pretext (civil servants can be dismissed without cause if in their current role for less than 12 months). The nation’s top vaccine epidemiology project by Dr. Nisha Acharya (Dr. Nisha Acharya) at UCSF had its funding canceled because her research could improve vaccine use, now grounds for grant revocation.
The NIH grandiosely announced that under new leadership, it would test drugs on revolutionary “organs on a chip” from the Wyss Institute, only to cancel its funding.
It’s painful to witness and articulate, so please forgive my brevity. In short, virologists and epidemiologists were already being harassed before this order, and now it’s a complete disaster.
T-i: What are the Trump administration’s motives behind this order and the broader trend? Are people tired of expert pressure perceived as restricting freedom? Or is it a result of conspiracy theories around scientific topics, from genetic modification and COVID to climate and 5G?
DP: During the campaign, Trump’s priority was neutralizing competition from independent candidate Kennedy and winning over some of his supporters. Trumpism doesn’t have a monopoly on skepticism toward scientists, conspiracies, or resentment over pandemic restrictions. Many liberal voters were equally enthusiastic about Kennedy and similar figures. Even the current FBI director reportedly profited from promoting “detox for RNA-vaccine poisoning.”
Perhaps this reflects the age of social media “echo chambers,” or it could be the downside of medicine’s success, leading people to fear infectious diseases less and more likely to deny the benefits of sanitation and vaccines. I won’t speculate on the rise of conspiracies, but Congress, which once resisted pseudoscience, has sadly caved in recent months.
T-i: What are the long-term consequences for American science? Could this lead to a brain drain or reduced competitiveness in biotechnology?
DP: American science has already sustained losses from which it may not recover for years, if at all. But mass migration of established scientists abroad is unlikely—it’s not easy. Young researchers and students will be more flexible in choosing countries for work.
T-i: How will this affect global medicine? If the U.S. halts infectious disease research, who can fill the gap?
DP: The dismantling of U.S. science and healthcare will have a global impact, as the U.S. accounts for roughly three-quarters of the modern drug and medical technology market. All quality developments, domestic and foreign, are funded with the U.S. market in mind. The FDA’s reorientation, now factoring in new barriers to vaccines, cancer, and antiviral drugs, has already altered the global biomedical development economy. Trump’s May 12, 2025, order forcing drug price reductions will further erode pharmaceutical companies’ interest in new developments.
While India and China play significant roles in the pharma industry, their innovative development is nascent. Even in China, top biomedical developers like Akeso Inc. lacked funds for quality work until U.S. market access became possible. The collapse of the U.S. innovation market will adversely affect developers and researchers worldwide.
T-i: Doesn’t this politicized interference in biology resemble events in Soviet science history? Are such comparisons apt given the scale and mechanisms?
DP: Politicized attacks on science and the rise of charlatans and opportunists echo Lysenkoism. Some details are so shocking you’d rub your eyes, wondering, “What century is this?” For instance, after the infamous 1948 VASKhNIL session, many geneticists weren’t jailed or fired but transferred to remote regions to “advance” veterinary science in Yakutia or similar places. A similar fate is now proposed for prominent U.S. researchers and epidemiologists: reassignment to rural clinics in the Indian Health Service (IHS) on remote reservations.
Russia in Nikolai Vavilov’s era, like the U.S. today, was a global genetics hub, not a backwater as it is now. Yet, the consequences of dismantling science then and now differ vastly. In the pre-DNA, biorobot, and supercomputer era, genetics aimed to address practical challenges but was largely abstract. Even genetic breakthroughs couldn’t have saved the impoverished Soviet collective farm system. Today’s biomedicine and biotechnology solve practical problems, impacting the health and quality of life of millions, making the societal resonance of science’s destruction far greater.
T-i: Could extreme U.S. biosecurity requirements paradoxically reduce safety?
DP: There’s a valid concern that excessive regulation of technologies and research will drive them abroad, particularly to China, with adverse safety consequences. This is particularly true for DNA synthesis, where China’s engineering and chemical potential could quickly take the lead.
More critically, two additional paths to reduced safety arise from dismantling U.S. biomedicine. First, the FDA’s withdrawal from vetting new drugs and vaccines will lead to approvals by other countries’ medical authorities, which often lack expertise, rigor, or are corrupt. Russia has already faced this issue, and now substandard trial problems will worsen. Second, the rollback of U.S. medical programs in developing countries will lead to new strains of tuberculosis, HIV, and other pathogens, posing global health threats.
T-i: How serious is the real biosecurity problem this order aims to address? Could a lab create a new pandemic pathogen or artificial life that destroys or displaces natural life?
DP: How do you address a slim chance of a catastrophic risk? “Highly unlikely, but if it happens, prepare for the worst”? Humans, like all creatures, are wired to instinctively fear catastrophic but unlikely events. Knowing this, I’d suggest tempering fears and relying more on expert recommendations. But in today’s political climate, experts speak in disarray.
History shows the worst biosecurity breaches occurred at secure defense facilities or during poorly planned use of live pathogens for vaccine production — often the same projects. Currently, global attention is focused on Vaktsina, a settlement near Sergiyev Posad in Moscow Oblast, where a Russian defense institute works with dangerous pathogens using dual-use technologies, such as aerosolizing pathogens, with industrial upgrades publicized globally, likely to intimidate the West and achieve a psychological impact.
From vaccine-related failures causing outbreaks, consider China’s 2019 brucellosis incident, infecting over 10,000 people. This and other examples suggest mRNA or subunit vaccines are far safer than “tried-and-true” older technologies.
T-i: If biosecurity is a serious issue, how adequate are the proposed measures? What alternative approaches could better balance risks and scientific progress?
DP: I consider existing safety measures sufficient, and if problems arise, they’re more likely from secretive military projects than open research. I’m also concerned about human encroachment on wildlife and the spread of disease vectors in populated areas. I’d agree with experts calling for enhanced biosecurity standards, but I can’t view the anonymous authors of this order as experts, given their clear political bias.
T-i: Some reputable scientists support strict safety measures, citing risks of creating artificial pathogens. Is there a rational basis for this, or is it a value conflict between researchers (seeking knowledge) and doctors (prioritizing safety)?
DP: Strict safety measures for handling dangerous pathogens are not only necessary but already in place. Disagreements arise over which pathogens and studies are deemed highly dangerous.
Past breaches involved traditionally isolated strains and old mistakes, not artificially enhanced or created microorganisms. There are no recent lab leak precedents, but new pathogens keep emerging from the wild and regions with weak healthcare systems.
However, if you accept the dubious claims of COVID’s artificial origin, a precedent seems to exist. Unfortunately, political expediency has made this theory official U.S. policy, despite lacking evidence. Thus, the question of adequate safety measures and research restrictions becomes hostage to political battles waged by those skilled in public emotional appeals but ignorant of biology.
Among strict regulation advocates are doctors who believe the safest approach is avoiding anything potentially dangerous. I’m surprised by this certainty in such a respected profession. Medicine always deals with risks of errors, complications, and side effects — unavoidable in treatment and prevention. Similarly, it’s impossible to track and predict pathogen evolution, prepare for new threats, or develop and improve drugs and vaccines without studying dangerous agents, despite fears of enhancing them in labs.
T-i: You noted the surprisingly weak response from U.S. media and the scientific community to the order. Why are leading scientists and outlets silent?
DP: Things weren’t as bad as I feared, and leading outlets did eventually respond, though later than I hoped. But the scientific community is still navigating intense political and financial pressure, and the desire to avoid being the “nail that gets hammered” is common.
T-i: It feels like Trump’s policy seeks to limit science’s freedom to set its own research directions. How does this affect the spirit of scientific inquiry?
DP: I’m not a fan of restricting the freedom of inquiry and scientific discussion and have been skeptical of traditional “gatekeepers” like bioethics specialists. Perhaps research associations could take on this role. But so be it.
T-i: After his inauguration, Trump unveiled the $500 billion AI project Stargate. Oracle’s Larry Ellison spoke of AI synthesizing personalized cancer vaccines soon. But these are the same mRNA vaccines now being restricted. Is there any coherent scientific policy in Trump’s administration?
DP: The new administration is full of chaos and back-and-forth, not just in science but in economic, diplomatic, and personnel policies too. While there’s often a malicious direction, the inconsistency adds fuel to the fire. Whether this stems from incompetence or a corrupt element — where insiders trade stocks knowing today’s policy will reverse tomorrow — is for future historians to unravel.
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Interviewed by Alexander Sergeev